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VOICES FROM THE PAST: RACE, PRIVILEGE,
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
SPENCER OVERTON*

Although campaignfinance reformersrecognize that in a privately

financed campaign system political inequality stems from wealth
inequality, their analysis is incomplete because they do not
question the validity of the existing distributionof property. This
Response explores how state-sanctioned discrimination against
racial minorities has contributed to current racial disparities in

property distribution, which are replicated in political
participation due to the current campaign finance system. A
campaign system that adopts the existing distributionof property
as a baseline of political influence has an ideological impact that

disadvantages individuals of color and the articulation of their
politicalperspectives.
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INTRODUCTION

In Race and Money in Politics, Professor Terry Smith correctly
observes that the plight of people of color is oversimplified when it is
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Houston Fellow, 19992000, Harvard Law School; J.D., 1993, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1990, Hampton
University. This Response benefited from exchanges with Anupam Chander, Holly
Doremus, Arturo Gandara, Bill Hing, Sam Hirsch, Margaret Johns, Kevin Johnson,
Thomas Joo, Kenneth Mack, Frank Michelman, Lisa Pruitt, Joseph Singer, Ronald
Sullivan, and Fane Wolfer. Special thanks to Damon J. Keith, Gene Nichol, William
Marshall, Melissa Saunders, Terry Smith, Michael Barnett, Jessica Friedman, Veronica
Higgs, James Norment, and Julie Song.
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equated with the

claims of the economically

disadvantaged.'

Advocates of campaign finance reform have not explored the
"meaning of political equality" for the economically disadvantaged
and the racially disadvantaged. They have failed to realize that these
two groups are "unequal for different reasons and to different
degrees."' 2 A consideration of campaign finance reform and race
raises several complex issues, many related to the failure of courts,
legislatures, and activists to address persisting racial inequality.
Professor Smith asks:
What does it mean for white voters, who are a controlling
majority, to claim that they are unequal? ... Can we

realistically equate wealth inequality with racial
inequality?... If wealth inequality's effect is to give the
wealthy greater access to the legislative process and more
favorable legislative outcomes, does not race inequality
discriminate in a similar way even in the absence of such a
wealth effect?'

This Response makes a related, but distinct, observation.
Professor Smith distinguishes racial disadvantage from economic
disadvantage.

Even when one

focuses solely on

economic

disadvantage, however, many people of color have fewer resources
for different reasons than their poor white counterparts. These
reasons have been ignored by campaign finance reform activists who
have made connections between race and campaign finance, 4 as well

1. Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics,79 N.C. L. REV. 1469,1473-75 (2001).
2. Id. at 1482.
3. Id.
4. As Professor Smith mentions, the movie Bulworth, produced and directed by
campaign finance reform activist Warren Beatty, made a connection between race and
campaign finance. See id. at 1470-72; see also Todd S. Purdum, Plan to Limit Political
Donations Gets Unlikely Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, § 1, at 31 (noting that Warren
Beatty "toyed ...with running for president on a platform of campaign finance
overhaul"). In addition, several civil rights and campaign finance activists have addressed
race and campaign finance at conferences sponsored by Howard Law School and the
National Voting Rights Institute, the Brennan Center, and the Asian Law Journal at the
University of California, Berkeley. The presentations contained critiques by activists,
policymakers, and legal practitioners. They did not, however, constitute comprehensive
treatment of race and campaign finance by academic legal commentators. See, e.g., John
Bonifaz, et al., Challenging the Campaign Finance System as a Voting Rights Barrier: A
Legal Strategy, 43 HOW. L.J. 65 (1999); Edward M. Chen, Introductionto Petition to U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, 5 ASIAN L.J. 353 (1998); Nat'l Asian Pacific American Legal
Consortium et al., Petition for Hearing Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 5
ASIAN L.J. 357 (1998); L. Ling-chi Wang, Beyond Identity and Racial Politics: Asian
Americans and the Campaign Fund-Raising Controversy, 5 ASIAN L.J. 329 (1998); Roger
Wilkins et al., Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 HOw. L.J. 41 (1999). A
number of individuals and civil rights groups represented at the Howard Conference
convened and established The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, which recognizes campaign
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as by academic legal commentators in favor of reform ("reformers")
who have not considered seriously the connection of the issues.5 Not
only have reformers overlooked the distinctions between racial
inequality and wealth inequality,6 but they also have failed to explore

the "different reasons" that people of color have less wealth and are
"political unequals" in the campaign finance context. This Response
connects the history of state-sanctioned discrimination to current
racial disparities in property distribution to reveal an important
critique of the privately financed campaign finance system.7
Reformers correctly observe that the inequalities in political
participation under the current campaign finance system arise directly
from the preexisting unequal distribution of property.8 Some
finance as a civil rights issue and explores the racial impact of the current campaign
finance system. See The Fannie Lou Hamer Project (1999), at http://www.flhp.org (last
visited Sept. 25, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Ben White,
Shadow Moves To New Venue With Old Issue, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2000, at A15
(describing efforts of The Fannie Lou Hamer Project "to encourage Americans to think of
campaign finance reform as a civil rights issue").
5. Reformers Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz acknowledge that financial
disadvantages faced by minority candidates may implicate concerns under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), but they relegate their examination to a
footnote. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 279 n.26 (1993) (admitting that their research is
"[p]reliminary" and that "the question of a Voting Rights Act violation ...is beyond the
scope of [their] Article"). Cass Sunstein briefly mentions that "[s]ometimes minority
candidates can succeed only with the help of PACs specifically organized for their
particular benefit. For this reason, PAC limits will in some circumstances diminish the
power of minority candidates." Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1409-10 (1994). Sunstein uses this effect of PAC
limits on minority candidates as an example to explain why campaign finance restrictions
are sometimes problematic, but does not engage in a comprehensive analysis as to why the
current campaign finance system may benefit or disadvantage people of color. See id. at
1413-14. Richard Hasen acknowledges ethnicity in explaining how his campaign finance
proposal allows citizens to associate voluntarily and petition based on group identity. See
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice
Defense of CampaignFinance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1, 57 (1996).
6. Smith, supra note 1, at 1481.
7. For a more extensive discussion of race and campaign finance, see Spencer
Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance (working
title for unpublished work-in-progress) (on file with author).
8. See J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal RealistApproaches to the
FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 379 (1990) ("One could argue that free speech in a
situation of radically unequal economic power is not free speech at all because it is skewed
by the preexisting distribution of property."); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter
A ConstitutionalPrinciple of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994)
(advocating an "equal-dollar-per-voter" campaign reform system because "wealthy
citizens should not be permitted to have a greater ability to participate in the electoral
process simply on account of their greater wealth"); Burt Neuborne, Toward a
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1072
(1999) ("A campaign financing system driven by extreme wealth disparity will inevitably
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reformers recognize the role of the state in the creation of laws that
make possible inequalities in property. 9 The analysis of the reformers
is incomplete, however, because they fail to question the legitimacy of
the existing distribution of property. Reformers have not asked why
past policies that have illegitimately shaped the distribution of
property, such as state-sanctioned discrimination against racial
minorities, should be replicated in the political process through the
seemingly benign current campaign finance system. Nor have they
asked why a campaign finance system based on a distribution of
private property that clearly has been shaped by past discriminatory
policies should be tolerated.

Part I of this Response observes that a history of state
discrimination has contributed to current racial disparities in property
distribution which are, due to the current campaign finance system,
replicated in political participation. Part II explains how a campaign
finance system built on the distribution of property sustains the
effects of past discriminatory policies and has an adverse ideological
impact on people of color. Though judicial and legislative rules
regarding the financing of politics are couched as neutral, objective,

impersonal, and indeterminate, they shape the racial distribution of
political power no less than the location of electoral boundary lines
drawn in redistricting.
I. RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

Noble factors such as hard work, discipline, and intelligence only
reflect the needs and concerns of the persons who pay for the system, and it will ignore the
needs and concerns of persons who lack the means to participate in the funding
process... This means that issues of importance to the holders of great wealth are more
likely to find themselves on the agenda than issues of importance to the poor."); Jamin
Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of
Democratically FinancedElections, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1160, 1162 (1994) ("Money is ...
unequally distributed, which means that persons who have more wealth can buy more
goods, including political and governmental favors."); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1390
(observing that "there is no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated into
disparities in political power").
9. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 414 ("The government is responsible for inequalities
in access to the means of communication because it has created the system of property
rights that makes such inequalities possible."); Foley, supra note 8, at 1242 (arguing that
"[j]ust because the electorate previously approved laws that granted the wealthy their
property rights does not mean these claims to wealth are ex ante legitimate for the next
election."); cf Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1399 ("[E]lections based on existing distributions
of wealth and entitlements also embody a regulatory system... Th[is] regulatory
system.., is not obviously neutral or just. On the contrary, it seems to be neither insofar
as it permits high levels of political influence to follow from large accumulations of
wealth.").
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partially shape the current distribution of property. A consideration
of how racial discrimination has influenced the distribution of
property is essential to understanding the structural problems
inherent in the existing campaign finance system. This part briefly
reviews a handful of past discriminatory policies and how they have
created racial disparities in the distribution of property and political
contributions.'0
A.

x
PastDiscriminatoryPolicies Shape PropertyDistribution"

Governmental entities have long used racial identity to define
and allocate property rights. Official government action in the form
of proclamations, statutes, and court decisions took land from Native
Americans based on their racial and cultural identity, and reallocated
this property to white private actors.' 2 The law contemplated and
enforced the appropriation of labor from African Americans through
slavery,1 3 which primarily benefited white private actors.' 4 The law
10. The focus of this Response on past state-sanctioned discriminatory policies is not
meant to suggest that past and present discrimination by private individuals has not
significantly shaped the distribution of property. See, e.g., EUNICE GRIER & GEORGE
GRIER, DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING; A HANDBOOK OF FACr 20-21 (1960) (finding
that "[a] very large proportion of the homeowning public supports discrimination by
builders, brokers and agencies of government").
11. While this section concentrates primarily on African Americans, Latinos, and
Native Americans in the United States, the analysis is not limited to these groups.
Distributions of property have been illegitimate due to other reasons, including but not
limited to other forms of discrimination based on ethnicity (e.g., Asian Americans) and
gender. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN, INC., WOMEN & HOUSING:
A REPORT ON SEx DISCRIMINATION IN FIVE AMERICAN CITIES, passim (1975)
(reporting problems that women in American cities face when they try to acquire and
maintain a decent place to live). The analysis is also applicable to groups in other
democracies whose lack of control over resources stems in large part from historical
decisions based on race or ethnicity (e.g., many indigenous and formerly segregated or
enslaved peoples throughout North and South America, South Africa, Zimbabwe,
Australia, Hawaii, and other areas). See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROPERTY: A BILL
OF RIGHTS IN A CONSTITUTION FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 298-319 (Roel de Lange et
al. eds., 1993) (proposing a differentiation of property rights in South Africa to
incorporate a concept of ownership attuned to the needs and desires of several interest
groups).
12. See Joseph William Singer, The Continuing Conquest: American Indian Nations,
Property Law, and Gunsmoke, in 1 RECONSTRUCTION 97, 102 (1991) ("[P]roperty and
sovereignty in the United States have a racial basis. The land was taken by force by white
people from peoples of color thought by the conquerors to be racially inferior."); see also
AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF
WILLIAM B. SCOIT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 6,120,133 (1977)

(stating that the English crown claimed dominion over American land inhabited by
primitive aboriginal tribes and proceeded to parcel it out to royal favorites).
13. Cf John Locke, Of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL

1546

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

also promoted immigration from European countries, essentially
determining the racial makeup of those who would count as full
citizens in the United States. 15 As white Americans moved west in
the 1800s, the law tolerated discriminatory practices in southwestern
states that stripped Mexican Americans of nearly all opportunities to
own property. 6 In addition to conquest, slavery, and immigration
policy, well-known public and private racial barriers in education,
employment, and business have disadvantaged people of color while
benefiting others through artificially reduced competition. 7
Less apparent factors also perpetuate economic disparities
between whites and people of color. The benefits derived from
facially discriminatory government policies may be multiplied by

POSITIONS 15, 18 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1992) ("[E]very Man has a Propertyin his own
Person.... The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly
his.").
14. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1718 (1993)
("The social relations that produced racial identity as a justification for slavery also had
implications for the conceptualization of property. This result was predictable, as the
institution of slavery ... was bound up with the idea of property. Through slavery, race
and economic domination were fused."). But see Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 466 (1989) ("[Slavery] degraded
labor and the meaning of labor for poor white working men in the South .... Thus,
slavery pulled white workers down in two ways: one, by direct competition with slave
labor in the South, and two, by associating all the industrious efforts of workers with those
of the degraded slaves.").
15. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP:

PROCESS AND POLICY 152 (4th ed. 1998) ("Some federal [immigration]

laws have been blatantly racist, prohibiting immigration and naturalization of aliens from
China and Japan and favoring northern and western Europeans over southern and eastern
Europeans."); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 859 (1987) ("The Chinese
Exclusion doctrine and its extensions have permitted, and perhaps encouraged, paranoia,
xenophobia, and racism, particularly during periods of international tension."); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race Matters: ImmigrationLaw andPolicy Scholarship,Law in the Ivory Tower,
and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 529 (discussing
"the legal requirement before 1952 that naturalization applicants be 'white' ").
16. See generally FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, THE HISPANIC POPULATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 17-22 (1987) (discussing the oppression of Mexican American
landowners by Anglo settlers after the Mexican-American War); CHARLES F. MARDEN
ET AL., MINORITIES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 135, 142, 152, 259-91 (1992) (discussing
Mexican American immigration and dominance by Anglo settlers); MARTIN N. MARGER,
RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 285-90 (2000) (noting that Mexicans' property was taken
"through official and unofficial force and fraud").
17. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 51 (1995) (stating that "every
circumstance of bias and discrimination against blacks has produced a ... positive gain for
whites").

See generally GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN

AMERICAN LAW (1910) (arguing that race distinctions in laws have hampered the
economic and educational opportunities of African Americans).
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facially neutral government policy and economic markets. Thus, they
may have a greater impact today than when they were originally
For example, the Federal Housing
enacted and enforced.
Administration (FHA), formed in 1934, promoted a model racially
restrictive covenant that whites could use to maintain neighborhood

"stability," thereby explicitly promoting segregated home ownership
among whites, and discouraging home ownership among non-whites. 8
Federally subsidized mortgages often required that owners
incorporate into their deeds racially restrictive covenants, 19 and
builders adopted the covenants to ensure that their property qualified
for federal insurance. 20 After perpetuating this segregation, the
federal government, concerned more about race than any other
demographic trend, "consistently gave black neighborhoods the
lowest rating for purposes of distributing federally subsidized
mortgages."' 21 Private lenders often followed the federal system in
making loan decisions.0
This racial disparity in wealth realized through home ownership
and home value originally caused by federal housing policies has since
been compounded by seemingly neutral public and private decisions.
Because people of color are less likely to own homes, they are less
likely to take advantage of tax provisions allowing for the deduction
of a large percentage of their housing costs (all property taxes and

18. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 39-41; see also KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190-218
(1985) (recounting the development of FHA appraisal standards that discriminated
against black communities by favoring lending in homogenous subdivisions); DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A.

DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE

MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 53-55 (1993) (documenting the effect of discrimination
resulting from FHA appraisal procedures in neighborhoods comprised of "inharmonious
racial or nationality groups"). In addition to housing policies that promoted home
ownership along racial lines, a number of other government policies have promoted racial
disparities in property distribution. For example, "[i]n the first half of the twentieth
century, various western states passed 'alien land laws' that limited the right to own
property to aliens racially eligible to naturalize, thereby effectively prohibiting foreignborn Asian residents from acquiring certain types of land." JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 42 (2d ed. 1997); see also Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1947) (invalidating specific application of California's Alien
Land Law as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1848 (1994) (citing CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OFPREJUDICE IN HOUSING 234-35 (1955)).
20. Id. (citing Martha Mahoney, Note, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing
and the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (1990)).
21. Id.at 1848 & n.9 (citing JACKSON, supra note 18, at 198-99; MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 18, at 52).
22. See id. at 1848 (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 18, at 52).
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mortgage interest),z
Further, homes purchased in the 1930s
increased greatly in value by the 1970s, and this increase benefited
whites more than people of color.24 Even people of color who were
able to purchase homes are less likely than comparable whites to
benefit due to the slower rate of appreciation of property in nonwhite areas.2
B.

CurrentDisparitiesin Income and Wealth
Past racial disparities in wealth arising directly from state-

sponsored discrimination
have been carried forward by
intergenerational transfers of wealth.26 While assets conveyed at
death are perhaps the most obvious permutation of these transfers,2 7
wealth also originates from other types of intergenerational transfers.
For example, wealth often derives from the "education, experiences,
friendships, and contacts" a child obtains from parents. 2 Whites tend
to receive disproportionate financial assistance from parents to
handle the challenges of early adulthood. For example, whites are
twice as likely as blacks to receive family assistance in purchasing a
home. 9 Indeed, wealth itself reflects a type of "resource available for
improving life chances, providing further opportunities, securing
prestige, passing status along to one's family, and influencing the
23. See I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(2)-(3), 164(a) (West 2000); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note
17, at 44 ("[T]he U.S. tax code channels benefits and encourages property and capital asset
accumulation differentially by race.").
24. See R. Richard Banks, "Nondiscriminatory"Perpetuationof Racial Subordination,
76 B.U. L. REv. 669, 684-85 (1996) (reviewing OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supranote 17).
25. See RAYMOND S. FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS 124-25 (1991)
(noting that homes owned by middle-class blacks "do not appreciate as rapidly in value
over time as homes owned by whites"); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 40, 150
(observing that "similar housing investments made by whites and blacks yield vastly
divergent returns-to the distinct disadvantage of blacks"); Ford, supra note 19, at 184952 (arguing that race-neutral legal doctrine reinforces residential segregation created by
public policy and private actors, causing significant disparity in the appreciation of blackowned homes and white-owned homes, in education, and in political influence). See
generally Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the
DetroitArea, 100 AM. J. Soc. 750 (1994) (arguing that racial stereotypes play an important
role in explaining whites' resistance to integrated neighborhoods).
26. Cf DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH,
AND SOCIAL POLICY INAMERICA 42-53 (1999) (arguing that many racial inequities result
from the disparities in accumulated family wealth).
27. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 155.
28. Id. at 152; see also Ngina S. Chiteji & Frank P. Stafford, Portfolio Choices of
Parents and Their Children as Young Adults: Asset Accumulation by African-American
Families, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 377-80 (1999) (studying cross-generational influences
on wealth and finding that a young family's likelihood of owning stock, a home, and other
assets is influenced by whether their parents held these financial assets).
29. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 145.
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political process."3 Intergenerational transfers of wealth, despite
being motivated by a concern for offspring rather than racial animus,
perpetuate the effects of racially discriminatory policies from over a
century ago, such as slavery and conquest. These intergenerational
transfers also perpetuate discriminatory policies enforced only a few
decades ago, such as racially disparate immigration policy, and
segregation in education, employment, and housing.
The effects of past discriminatory policies are partially reflected

in contemporary disparities among racial groups in median household
income and net worth. In 1995, median household income was
$35,766 for whites, $22,860 for Latinos, and $22,393 for African
Americans . 3 Examination of contemporary household net worth,
which consists of all assets less any debts, reveals a more complete
picture of the effects of intergenerational transfers of wealth.3 2 In
1995, the median net worth for white households ($61,000) was over
eight times greater than African-American households ($7,400) and
over twelve times greater than Latino households ($5,000). When
equity in owner-occupied housing is subtracted, the disparities are
even more glaring. Financial wealth was $18,000 for the typical white
household in 1995, $200 for the typical African-American household,
and $0 for the typical Latino household 4
Similarly, African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans are
disproportionately represented among those Americans having the
most dire financial conditions. Whereas only 7.7% of whites live in
poverty, 23.6% of African Americans, 22.8% of Latinos, and 25.9%

of Native Americans live in poverty. 5

In 1995, 15% of white

30. See id. at 32.
31. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at
viii (1996).
32. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 58 ("[N]et worth ... conveys the
straightforward value of all assets less any debts.") (emphasis omitted).
33. CHUCK COLLINS ET AL., SHIFTING FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING
AMERICAN WEALTH GAP 57 (1999) (finding that in 1995, the median household net
worth for whites was $61,000, African Americans $7,400, and Hispanics $5,000); see also
CONLEY, supra note 26, at tbl. A2.1 (finding that in 1994, the median family net worth for
whites was $72,000 and for African Americans was $9,771).
34. COLLINS, supra note 33, at 57; see also CONLEY, supra note 26, at tbl. A2.1.
35. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at v
(2000); see Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through
Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711,714 (1996) ("According to ... researchers with the
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 'American Indian
reservations are notable for their extreme and persistent poverty-reservation Indians are
the poorest minority in the United States'.... [I]n some tribes, such as the Navajo, more
than 45 percent of families live in poverty.") (quoting STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P.
KALT,

MALCOLM WIENER

CTR. FOR SOCIAL POLICY, WHERE'S

THE GLUE?
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households had a zero or negative net worth (greater debt than
assets), compared to 31% of African-American and 38% of Latino
households.

6

The aforementioned data should not suggest that racial
inequality can be measured with straightforward, mathematical
precision. A number of complicating factors exist. For example,
Asian Americans are not a single, uniform community, but consist of
over thirty different ethnic groups. Some of these Asian-American
ethnic groups have, on average, higher incomes than whites, while
others have much lower average incomes.37 Some citizens of color
migrated to the United States after discriminatory laws were
repealed.
Government policies have attempted to aggressively
recruit well-educated and highly-skilled foreign-born workers,
including people of color. 3 s The adverse impact of discriminatory
laws is more attenuated for some individuals of color than for others.
These complicating factors, however, do not detract from the
proposition that past discriminatory laws have shaped the existing
racial distribution of resources. 31
INSTITUTIONAL BASES OF AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 (Harvard

Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Report No. 52,1991)).
36. COLLINS, supra note 33, at 81; see also CONLEY, supra note 26, at tbl. A2.1.
37. The median income for Asian Americans as a group is 12% higher than whites,
but the poverty rate of Asian Americans is 50% greater than whites. Kelvin M. Pollard &
William P. O'Hare, America's Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 54 POPULATION BULL. No. 3,
Sept. 1999, at 34, 41, available at http://www.prb.org/pubslpopulation_bulletinfbu543/Income_Wealth_ Poverty.htm. Although data regarding the wealth of Asian Americans
is not available, it is likely that it is lower, as Asian Americans have a lower rate of home
ownership and business ownership than white Americans. Id. at 37-39.
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (allowing visas for priority workers who
possess "extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics"); 8
U.S.C. § 1153 (b)(1)(B) (allowing visas for "outstanding professors and researchers"); 8
U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(C) (allowing visas for "certain multinational executives and
managers"); 8 U.S.C. § 11153(b)(2) (allowing visas for "members of the professions
holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability"); see also Jung S. Hahm,
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: Balancing Economic
and LaborInterests Underthe New H-1B Visa Program,85 CORNELL L. REv. 1673, 167879 (2000) (observing that that provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 "was the result of
congressional efforts to increase admissions of foreign skilled workers into the United
States"); Bill Ong Hing, Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOw. LJ. 237,
267 (1994) (noting that "the near tripling of occupational visas from 54,000 to 140,000 in
the 1990 legislation signals the beginning of a shift in the focus of U.S. immigration law
from concern with family reunification toward a policy of importing skilled workers").
39. In other words, even though past discrimination has not impacted the economic
status of every individual of color to the same degree, the current system of funding
campaigns poses problems because many people of color continue to be adversely
impacted by past discrimination.
While a precise measurement of past racial
discrimination and its effects on individuals might be appropriate in analyzing other issues,
such as whether particular individuals should receive reparation payments, such precision
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C. Disparitiesin Contributions
It should come as no surprise that racial disparities in the control
over economic resources are mirrored in the context of political
contributions. A 1997 study directed by scholars at Georgetown
University, the University of Akron, the University of Maryland, and
the University of Rochester surveyed individuals who contributed
$200 or more to congressional campaigns in the 1996 election cycle.4 °
Of those who responded to the survey, 95% identified themselves as
white, and less than 1% identified themselves as people of color.41
These trends do not appear to be unusual. For example, a 1992 study
of contributors to winning candidates for the Georgia Legislature
revealed that 97% of contributors were white while only 2% were
African-American. 42
Another study found that a disproportionately small number of
contributions come from neighborhoods that are populated
predominately by people of color. The study, sponsored by Public
Campaign,43 compared the racial composition of zip codes to zip code
data disclosed by political contributors. 4 The study noted that in zip
is not needed to make the more modest claim that the distribution of private property is
an inadequate baseline for political participation.
40. Smaller contributions need not be reported to the Federal Election Commission.
See John Green et al., Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy,
Conservative and Reform-Minded, at 2 (1998), available at http://www.opensecrets.org/
pubs/donors/donors.htm. The study was based on data obtained through a 1997 mail
survey to contributors randomly drawn from Federal Election Commission records. Id. at
12. About half of those drawn responded to the survey, and the conclusions of the study
were based upon these 1,118 responses. Id. The margin of error is plus or minus 4%. Id.
41. See id. at 13 (showing that 95% of contributors surveyed indicated that they are
white); Ellen Miller, Guess What? PoliticalDonors are Old, Rich, White Men, THE HILL,
July 1, 1998, at 5, LEXIS, The Hill File ("[L]ess than 1 percent in the Joyce survey
identified themselves as people of color."). While minorities gave about 1% of the
political contributions, they cast 23% of the votes in the 2000 general Presidential election,
suggesting that the contribution disparity is more closely related to an inability to give
than political apathy. See Marjorie Connelly, Who Voted.- A Portraitof American Politics,
1976-2000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2000, at WK 4.
42. See JOHN A. CLARK & JOHN M. BRUCE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN
GEORGIA 7 (1994) ("In the 1990 Census, the population of Georgia was reported to be
71% white and 27% black. Our pool of respondents was just over 97% white, with only
about 2% black."); Richard Whitt, 'Typical' Donor no Average Georgian,ATLANTA J.
CONST., Dec. 14, 1994, at C2 ("More than 97 percent of contributors responding to the
survey were white and only 2 percent were black.... Questionnaires were mailed in
August and September to 1,155 contributors, with 357 initial responses.").
43. Public Campaign is a public interest organization that favors public financing of
CAMPAIGN
See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, THE COLOR OF MONEY:
campaigns.
CONTRIBUTIONS AND RACE 2 (1998). For general information on Public Campaign and
an abbreviated version of the study, see http://www.publiccampaign.org.
44. See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, supra note 43, at 11-13. The Federal Election
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codes populated predominately by people of color, the average per
capita income was $9,046.! 5 For every 10,000 residents in these zip
codes, only eight political contributions were made. 6 In contrast, in
the average American zip code, incomes were 37% higher and
residents were three times more likely to make political
contributions. 47 In the twenty-six zip codes where residents gave the
most money, incomes were 408% higher and residents were fifty-four
times more likely to contribute than those in predominately nonwhite areas.4 8 Also, in comparing the twenty-six zip codes where
residents gave the most money to the 2,492 predominately non-white
zip codes, the study found that the 0.68 million inhabitants of the
former contributed more money than the 41.4 million inhabitants of
the latter.49

In summary, current racial disparities in contributions are not
isolated from current racial disparities in income and wealth or past
state-sponsored discrimination.
II. RACE AND THE FALSE NEUTRALITY OF THE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SYSTEM

As explained in part I, the current distribution of property is not
natural or free of racial bias, but is shaped in large part by past
racially discriminatory laws. A privately financed campaign system
that adopts the existing distribution of property as a legitimate
baseline of political power has an ideological impact that
disadvantages individuals of color and the articulation of their
political perspectives.
Commission does not require that contributors disclose their racial identity. Id. at 11.
Therefore, to obtain its findings, the Public Campaign study compared Census Bureau
data on racial composition of zip codes with Federal Election Commission data on
contributions given by individuals in particular zip codes to federal candidates, political
action committees, and political parties during the 1995-1996 election cycle. Id.
45. Id. at 37.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 36-37.
48. See id. at 37. Note that while Public Campaign reports that the average American
zip code is 75.7% white, id. at 36, the twenty-six highest giving zip codes have an only
slightly higher white population of 78%. See id. at 22-23 (calculation based on chart).
One might argue that these figures indicate that higher end neighborhoods contain
significant numbers of people of color who are making contributions. Public Campaign
suggests that, instead, this data often reflects that a single zip code may contain both highcontributing wealthy white neighborhoods and low-contributing working-class
neighborhoods populated predominately by people of color. See id. at 6.
49. Id. at 37. While racial disparities in political spending have not been studied as
extensively as racial disparities in political contributions, there is no evidence that the
expenditure racial disparity is any less stark than the contribution racial disparity.
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Even after racially discriminatory laws have been eliminated, the
law has ratified the misallocation of property by protecting the settled
expectations of those who obtained economic benefits under a
discriminatory regime.50 Legal protections of settled expectations,
along with doctrines that build upon existing property rights-such as
First Amendment applications that protect the use of political
expenditures and contributions-obscure continued privilege based
on past discriminatory practices. These doctrines make the existing
economic order appear fair and equal.51 The existing campaign
finance system, however, advances the political ideologies of those
who have profited from the racial misallocation of property. These

state-created advantages allow individuals with certain racial
backgrounds to obtain an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.52
By accepting arguments that base campaign finance on existing
distributions of private property, courts and legislatures simply
reaffirm discriminatory public and private decisions of the past 3 For
example, a discriminatory law that prevented a young AfricanAmerican woman in Alabama from attending a good public school in
1951 affected more than just the educational and economic
opportunities available to her and her children. Due to the current
50. See Harris, supra note 14, at 1714 ("After legalized segregation was overturned,
whiteness as property evolved into a more modern form through the law's ratification of
the settled expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.").
In some situations, courts refuse to protect or ratify expectations in property acquired
under a discriminatory regime. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948)
(invalidating judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants).
51. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, 101 HARv. L.
REV. 1331, 1351-52 (1988) (stating that law "embodies and reinforces ideological
assumptions about human relations that people accept as natural or even immutable"
thereby suppressing conflict, antagonism, and questions regarding the legitimacy of the
status quo); Harris, supra note 14, at 1777 ("The law masks what is chosen as natural; it
obscures the consequences of social selection as inevitable. The result is that the
distortions in social relations are immunized from truly effective intervention, because the
existing inequities are obscured and rendered nearly invisible.").
52. Cf Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (citing
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (permitting restrictions on
corporate expenditures in support of political candidates, reasoning that the state gives
corporations special advantages in accumulating resources, and that these "state-created
advantages" allow corporations "to use 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace'
to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace"').
53. Cf Johnson, supra note 15, at 529 n.20 ("Although the most invidious
discrimination in the naturalization laws has been removed, the legacy of exclusion must
be examined to ensure that its discriminatory influence can be extracted root and
branch."); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuationof Past Discrimination,96 HARv. L. REV. 828,
passim (1983) (exploring the employment of legal doctrine to prevent perpetuation of past
racial discrimination).
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private property-based campaign finance system, the discriminatory
law also impairs their ability to participate in politics in 2001. 54
Further, privately financed politics are likely to create future racial
disparities in the distribution of resources. Due to the inability of the

same African-American woman and her children to participate in the
current campaign finance system in 2001, it is more probable that
future lawmaking will steer economic resources and opportunities
away from her, her children, and their descendants. The benefits of
lawmaking will more likely be directed toward contributors and
similarly situated persons with resources, who have directly or
indirectly benefited from past discriminatory policies.5
Unexamined by reformers, the exacerbation of racial disparities
in the distribution of resources caused by privately financed politics

has profound consequences for race relations in America. Privately
financed politics, framed by a history of facially discriminatory laws
that have contributed to a present-day disparity in control over
resources, reproduce racial disparities in the distribution of
resources. 56 Campaign finance doctrine plays a significant part in
the skewed racial allocation of economic and political
maintaining
57
resources.

The analysis advanced in this Response may not gain universal
acceptance. Some will contend that racial disparities in property
holdings reflect a coincidental distribution of individual merit, and it
54. Some have argued that segregation is inherently unequal. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate education facilities are inherently
unequal."). Others, however, have noted that improved funding and educational
opportunities for African-American children in schools should have been the true goal,
and that this objective went unmet. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN
LAW 612-616 (3d ed. 1992). Regardless of one's definition of the problem and solution,
discriminatory laws created a situation in which our young woman in 1951 received a
substandard education.
55. Cf Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics
of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1266-67 (2000) (discussing the cycle of
entrenchment that arises from the failure to restrict the use of political money).
56. Professor Foley's argument that the existing distribution of resources should not
determine future distributions of resources is strengthened when one considers that the
existing distribution has been shaped by policies that are no longer legitimate. See Foley,
supra note 8, at 1204 ("An important function of electoral politics is to determine how
wealth should be distributed among society's members. The existing distribution of wealth
at the time of any particular election should not affect the electorate's determination of
what the distribution should be henceforth.").
57. Cf. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness, History, and the Law, in THE
HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT: BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN 280, 285 (Walmeema
Lubiano ed., 1997) (observing that "[f]ormal equality in conditions of social inequality
becomes a tool of domination, reinforcing that system and insulating it from attack").
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is thus fair to construct a campaign finance system based on private
property. Another group may claim that no manageable method of
accounting for the impact of past racial wrongs exists. Thus, that
group may choose to tolerate the status quo not only in the economic
marketplace, but also with regard to democratic participation under
the current campaign finance system. Others assert that proposed
reforms will fail to address the problems of the existing system, and

will likely cause new problems.5

Some important scholars articulate

these perspectives, and their insights should not be casually dismissed
in making political judgments about campaign finance regulation.
Nevertheless, there is no apolitical, determinate organizing principle
that mandates that society as a whole must adopt these judgments to
the exclusion of the historical and continuing relationship between
race and private property.59 While supporters of a privately financed
political system with minimal regulation may specify a vision of the
world that tolerates the protection of participatory rights acquired
due to past discriminatory policies, others should not be forced to
embrace this normative interpretation.6
One problem with current jurisprudence, however, is that it
limits the political understandings of the role of property by
extending high constitutional protection to property used in the
campaign finance context.6 ' While property rights shaped by racial
58. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1999) (arguing that reform "proposals may increase,
rather than dampen, the role of money in politics" and make politics less accountable to
democratic control). But see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:
The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 303-04 (1989) (arguing
that opponents of reform have little empirical evidence to support their proposition that
reforms "are far more likely to be harmful than beneficial," and that there are also
unanticipated consequences in maintaining the status quo).
59. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 51, at 1346 ("[L]aw itself does not dictate which of
various visions will be adopted as an interpretive base. The choice between various visions
and the values that lie within them is not guided by any determinate organizing
principle.").
60. Arguments for both campaign finance reform and the status quo rest upon a
descriptively and normatively contestable vision of politics. Cf. Issacharoff & Karlan,
supra note 58, at 1708 (contending that "once the case for reform is understood to rest on
a descriptively and normatively contestable vision of Politics, we will be in a better
position to discuss both the attractiveness of particular proposals for reform and the limits
of a reform strategy"); William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 335, 376 (2000) (finding that "[d]emocracy does not have an
ideal archetype" and thus the case for campaign finance reform "must be tempered by the
awareness that there is no clear guidepost from which to evaluate whether democracy is,
or is not, working").
61. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000) (interpreting the
appropriate standard for reviewing contribution limits as more stringent than intermediate
scrutiny but "different" from the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits).
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discrimination are generally subject to restriction and redistribution

in the economic sphere,62 these same property rights are more
absolute and impenetrable when exercised in the political context. 63

Unfortunately, current campaign finance jurisprudence strictly
protects the settled expectations of those who have benefited from

illegitimate distributions of property, and4 generally ignores those
disadvantaged by illegitimate distributions.6
CONCLUSION

Professor Smith's critique of reformers is important, in part,
because it prompts a consideration of the ways in which racial
inequality is distinct from other forms of inequality. The disparities in
wealth that disproportionately disadvantage people of color in the
context of campaign finance cannot be explained solely by differences
in work ethic, discipline, or talent, but are shaped by illegitimate
factors such as past racial discrimination. The choice to maintain the
existing system of campaign finance perpetuates the effects of past
discriminatory laws and the historical devaluation of racial minorities

as participants in democracy.
It is unlikely that any campaign finance reform proposal will

result in a political process that is completely immune from
disproportionate influence arising from the illegitimate distribution of

property. There are also conceptual challenges in drawing bright
lines that distinguish campaign finance regulation from restraints on
62. See Overton, supra note 55, at 1239 (observing that "courts... generally allow for
broad legislative regulation of property and economic transactions in areas as varied as
minimum wage, antitrust, zoning, rent control, and environmental law").
63. Cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 260 (1990)
("Why give up the overt formal limits [on the legislature] with respect to economic
regulation and social assistance, and enforce the power and privilege of property against
the egalitarian measures of campaign finance laws?"); Frank Michelman, Political Truth
and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUDIES IN L. 281, 288 (1988) (asking why realism
and relativism "have been such potent destroyers of juristic absolutism shielding the
market manifestations of property rights against legislative control, but so impotent...
when it comes to their manifestations in the political sphere"); Frank I. Michelman,
Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property,72 IOWA L. REV. 1319,
1344-45 (1987) ("Why have realism and relativity been such potent destroyers of juristic
absolutism regarding legislative control of the market manifestations of possessive
property rights, while absolutism still shields their manifestations in the political
sphere?").
64. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (rejecting as illegitimate the
government's alleged interest in equalization of the ability of citizens to affect elections by
stating that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment").
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the exercise of other expressive and associational liberties.65
Nevertheless, racial hierarchy cannot be tempered when
decisionmakers ignore or passively tolerate the ways in which current
campaign finance jurisprudence frames the economic and political
A more comprehensive
experiences of people of color.
understanding of the campaign finance problem requires the
integration of race as an important analytical consideration.

65. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to
Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 939, 947 (1985) (reviewing ELIZABETH DREW,
POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983)) ("To the extent that it
strikes us as dubious ... to limit the ability of a newspaper to campaign actively for its
favorite candidates, then we should at least question why it would be any more legitimate
to limit the amount of spending by an individual eager to support the same candidate.").
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